Description

Probable Name: Unknown
MD5: 7dc720d62553119efa2ca180237cc530
SHA1: 88ad20c1fdb46daf9965b0d15e4fa538647ff075
SHA256: 07bd6ebb9b4a3a93e0f6b25a4385828452373f9d12c632c0f3b7767851f857f9
Password of zip file: infected
Duration:
Proxy Usage: This capture did use an intermediate proxy.
VirusTotal
HybridAnalysis
RobotHash

Files

.capinfos
- Capinfos file
.dnstop
- DNS top file
mitm.out
- Mitm proxy interception file of http and https
.mitm.weblog
- This is the HTTP and HTTPS web log that includes Labels. This is the preferred file for web analysis.
- This file includes a header with the columns names. There are two new columns defined by us:
  - Column id: This number is unique for all the weblogs generated inside the same TCP connection. When a TCP connection is opened and several GET/POST, etc., requests are made inside it, all of them are assigned the same Id in this file.
  - Column timestamp_end: This is the timestamp when the weblog ended. If you use this with the id column you can compute the total duration of the TCP connection that generated all the weblogs. Similar to the duration of a hypothetical CONNECT request if this would have been done using a proxy.
.passivedns
- Passive DNS file
.pcap
- Original pcap file
.rrd
- RRD file for graphs
.weblogng
- WEB log of http traffic only. Generated with justsniffer
.exe.zip
- Original malware file
bro
- Folder with all the bro output files
.biargus
- Argus binary file. Bidirectional flows, 3600s of report time.
.binetflow
- Argus text file with bidirectional flows. Report time 3600 secs.
.uniargus
- Argus binary file. Unidirectional flows, 5s of report time.
.uninetflow
- Argus text file with unidirectional flows. Report time 5 secs. TAB as column separator.

IP Addresses

- Infected host: 10.0.2.102
- Default GW: 10.0.2.1

Timeline

Fri, 13 Jun 2014 09:22:10 Approx

started infected

Sun, 22 Jun 2014 20:14:30 GMT

Stopped win2.

Analysis

DGA

Exmple of DNS requests 551165.524933 C3g4OkyKMFazwOfWf 10.0.2.102 61992 8.8.8.8 53 udp 9424 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 551166.611260 COgZ3Ieg1L4feK0K8 10.0.2.102 61344 8.8.8.8 53 udp 50451 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 551169.724672 CPCMog40hBKV3CNpya 10.0.2.102 54704 8.8.8.8 53 udp 14208 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 551173.724929 CPCMog40hBKV3CNpya 10.0.2.102 54704 8.8.8.8 53 udp 14208 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A - - F F 551170.720904 CugHMb4M0rsZ7hbvMg 10.0.2.102 54704 4.4.4.4 53 udp 14208 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A - - F F 551171.722160 CugHMb4M0rsZ7hbvMg 10.0.2.102 54704 4.4.4.4 53 udp 14208 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A - - F F 551173.725016 CugHMb4M0rsZ7hbvMg 10.0.2.102 54704 4.4.4.4 53 udp 14208 - xivpx1403202.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A - - F F 808196.150642 CqwMV60BOnmu9GRo5 10.0.2.102 59060 8.8.8.8 53 udp 22940 - kpduo1403459.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 808196.491335 CBD1sQ3zkZlX01RjV7 10.0.2.102 60706 8.8.8.8 53 udp 5194 - kpduo1403459.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 808803.633797 CcUjWD1tOI0Dx85U5e 10.0.2.102 59177 8.8.8.8 53 udp 2408 - chgqz1403460.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 808803.909128 Cqac9P37rxoAyHztq4 10.0.2.102 61213 8.8.8.8 53 udp 14256 - chgqz1403460.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 808804.426798 CN8P7y3i12P1DhDPCd 10.0.2.102 57076 8.8.8.8 53 udp 48013 - chgqz1403460.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 808804.666229 CZlwBn2ARK61Ir6cxe 10.0.2.102 53778 8.8.8.8 53 udp 25208 - chgqz1403460.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 810224.561945 Cur8nK2U5EmlCLKlb4 10.0.2.102 51876 8.8.8.8 53 udp 39506 - nteze1403461.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 810224.894741 CMZNU34vCkQhQ0l2xd 10.0.2.102 53750 8.8.8.8 53 udp 51688 - nteze1403461.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 810269.407254 CfUrdS12IV61t3o2Qd 10.0.2.102 60284 8.8.8.8 53 udp 11167 - zrayy1403461.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F 810269.459644 CdhR6Z3KV31AX4xabh 10.0.2.102 51857 8.8.8.8 53 udp 12018 - zrayy1403461.br.whoer.net 1 C_INTERNET 1 A 3 NXDOMAIN F

Disclaimer

These files were generated in the Stratosphere Lab as part of the Malware Capture Facility Project in the CVUT University, Prague, Czech Republic. The goal is to store long-lived real botnet traffic and to generate labeled netflows files. Any question feel free to contact us: Sebastian Garcia: sebastian.garcia@agents.fel.cvut.cz

You are free to use these files as long as you reference this project and the authors as follows: Garcia, Sebastian. Malware Capture Facility Project. Retrieved from https://stratosphereips.org