Description

• Probable Name: Wannacry. Version with second kill-switch domain. There are real malware infections on port 445/tcp by using a honeypot.
• MD5: d5dcd28612f4d6ffca0cfeaefd606bcf
  
• SHA1: cf60fa60d2f461dddfdfcebf16368e6b539cd9ba
  
• SHA256: 32f24601153be0885f11d62e0a8a2f0280a2034fc981d8184180c5d3b1b9e8cf
  
• Password of zip file: infected
• Duration: 895s
• This capture uses a mitm proxy on all TLS ports and a redirection to a dioanea honeypot on port 445/tcp.
• VirusTotal
• HybridAnalysis
• RobotHash

Files

• .capinfos
  • Capinfos file
• .dnstop
  • DNS top file
• mitm.out
  • Mitm proxy interception file of http and https
• .mitm.weblog
  • This is the HTTP and HTTPS web log that includes Labels. This is the preferred file for web analysis.
  • This file includes a header with the columns names. There are two new columns defined by us:
    • Column id: This number is unique for all the weblogs generated inside the same TCP connection. When a TCP connection is opened and several GET/POST, etc., requests are made inside it, all of them are assigned the same Id in this file.
    • Column timestamp_end: This is the timestamp when the weblog ended. If you use this with the id column you can compute the total duration of the TCP connection that generated all the weblogs. Similar to the duration of a hypothetical CONNECT request if this would have been done using a proxy.
• .passivedns
  • Passive DNS file
• .pcap
  • Original pcap file
• .rrd
  • RRD file for graphs
• .weblogng
  • WEB log of http traffic only. Generated with justsniffer
• .exe.zip
  • Original malware file
• bro
  • Folder with all the bro output files
• .biargus
  • Argus binary file. Bidirectional flows, 3600s of report time.
• .binetflow
  • Argus text file with bidirectional flows. Report time 3600 secs.
• .uniargus
  • Argus binary file. Unidirectional flows, 5s of report time.
• .uninetflow
  • Argus text file with unidirectional flows. Report time 5 secs. TAB as column separator.

IP Addresses

- Infected host: 192.168.1.120
- Default GW: 192.168.1.2

Timeline

Sun May 14 15:18:34 CEST 2017

started win10

Sun May 14 15:23:03 CEST 2017

infected

Sun May 14 15:33:36 CEST 2017

power off

Traffic analysis

Due to a problem in the DNS server provider, the domain does not resolved to an IP, and therefore the infection continued. In most situations the domain will kill the malware. However it was possible t see here the real infection

Disclaimer

These files were generated in the Stratosphere Lab as part of the Malware Capture Facility Project in the CVUT University, Prague, Czech Republic. The goal is to store long-lived real botnet traffic and to generate labeled netflows files. Any question feel free to contact us: Sebastian Garcia: sebastian.garcia@agents.fel.cvut.cz

You are free to use these files as long as you reference this project and the authors as follows: Garcia, Sebastian. Malware Capture Facility Project. Retrieved from https://stratosphereips.org